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Abstract  
Knowledge is a central concept within both Bayesian inference and the mathematical and 
philosophical program of logic and semiotics initiated by Charles Sanders Peirce and further 
developed by George Spencer-Brown and Louis Kauffman. The latter school is more 
philosophical than is usual with the practitioners of Bayesian inference and claims the existence 
of a world mind. When these two disciplines inform each other semiotics is provided with 
mathematical mechanism and Bayesian inference is seen to be closely related to the act of 
distinction, the fundamental basis of logic in the work of Spencer-Brown. Given that Darwinian 
processes are physical implementations of Bayesian inference and are utilized within numerous 
scientific theories across a wide range of disciplines as mechanisms for the creation and 
evolution of knowledge we may view the conjunction of these theories, within universal 
Darwinism, as descriptive of a world mind. 
Introduction 
Bayesian probability is often defined as representing a state of knowledge (Jaynes 1986) and 
Bayesian inference is the primary mathematical tool for describing knowledge. Another 
mathematical and philosophical approach to knowledge is found within the work of Charles 
Sanders Peirce and George Spencer-Brown. Louis Kauffman observed that Spencer-Brown, with 
the Laws of Form (1979), completed a program to develop the foundations of mathematical logic 
which had been begun by Peirce and provides a comment on the significance of this program 
(Kauffman 2001): 
It remained for Spencer-Brown (some fifty years after Peirce and Nicod) to see the 
relevance of an arithmetic of forms underlying his notation and thus putting the final 
touch on a development that, from a broad perspective, looks like the world mind doing 
its best to remember the significant patterns that join logic, speech and mathematics. 
Peircean semiotics is a related but more philosophical effort to understand ‘the world mind’. It 
describes knowledge as involving a triad of components: the object, a sign which signifies the 
object, and an interpretant or the mental effect caused upon a person by the sign.  It will be of 
interest that Peirce considered his linking of interpretant to a human mental state as a 
simplification to ease understanding (Peirce 2001): 
My insertion of "upon a person" is a sop to Cerberus, because I despair of making my 
own broader conception understood. [...]  
Presumably this broader conception understands that there are components other than those 
related to humans which compose the world mind. 
Spencer-Brown’s mathematics and philosophy start with the concept of a distinction. From this 
concept he is able to derive mathematical logic, Boolean algebra and thereby the foundations of 
mathematics. Mathematics includes probability but this route from distinction to probability is 
circuitous. The demonstration by E.T. Jaynes that logic is entailed within probability theory as a 
special case (2003) suggests that a shorter route may exist.  
Inherent to Spencer-Browns conception of ‘distinction’ is both a ‘mark’ to mark the distinction 
and an observer. The concluding sentence of Laws of Form, is: 
We see now that the first distinction, the mark and the observer are not only 
interchangeable, but, in the form, identical. 
It has also been noted that Spencer-Brown’s paradigm meshes well with Peircean semiotics 
(Kauffman 2001) if we equate distinction with object, mark with sign and observer with 
interpretant. The choice of the word ‘observer’ should be understood here in the Einsteinium 
manner as a generalized entity able to react to measurements or data or some other 
instantiation of a sign. I suggest the word ‘model’ be used to guard against anthropocentric 
interpretations. 
Although the model of logic and semiotics developed by Peirce and Spencer-Brown may be 
suggestive of a world mind capable of building and processing knowledge it lacks details. Clearly 
it offers some insight into the relationship between models (interpretants) and that which is 
modeled (objects) a relationship we might consider to be knowledge however the mechanisms 
which relates object to sign and sign to model are left unspecified.  
If semiotics is to serve as a useful paradigm for knowledge it should be expected to encompass 
science. Indeed, science, understood as a process of Bayesian inference, may be cast in a triad 
form compatible with semiotics: phenomena, data, model. The inclusion of Bayesian inference 
brings a particular strength to the semiotic paradigm. Bayesian experimental design provides a 
mechanism for extracting data (signs) from the phenomena (object) so as to maximize the 
expected knowledge gain of the model (interpretant). It also provides the mechanism for using 
data to most effectively update models in the form of the Bayesian update. 
Probability distributions employed as models within Bayesian inference have the property of 
information entropy; the amount of information which separates the model from certainty. If 
the log of the probabilities used in the inference is to base two then the information is measured 
in bits. Bits are the basic unit of distinction. The model’s entropy is the number of distinctions 
which separate it from certainty. While the models treated within Bayesian inference may be 
separated from certainty by any finite number of distinctions the special case of one bit 
separations from certainty is the case where Bayesian inference becomes isomorphic with 
classical logic. 
Models within Bayesian inference are moved towards certainty by incorporating the 
implications of data (sign) into the model (interpretant); through the process of the Bayesian 
updating. Mathematically this is the unique method of moving a model towards certainty 
(Jaynes 2003); that is of increasing knowledge. Bayesians have frequently committed the error 
of assuming that knowledge is a human property and that Bayesian inference is descriptive of a 
solely human activity. Spencer-Brown did not indulge in this misconception; he maintained a 
focus on the world mind. 
Thus we cannot escape the fact that the world we know is constructed in order (and 
thus in such a way as to be able) to see itself. 
This is indeed amazing. 
Not so much in view of what it sees, although this may appear fantastic enough, but in 
respect of the fact that it can see at all. 
But in order to do so, evidently it must first cut itself up into at least one state which 
sees, and at least one state which is seen. In this severed and mutilated condition, 
whatever it sees is only partially itself. 
It can be appreciated that this world mind is well described within the context of science if we 
accept that Bayesian inference is isomorphic to the Darwinian process. The operation of a 
Darwinian process is a physical implementation of the mathematics of Bayesian inference (J. O. 
Campbell 2009). Scientific theories which describe the creation and evolution of their subject 
matter as due to the operation of Darwinian processes are ubiquitous across disciplines within 
the scientific literature (Campbell, Universal Darwinism; The path of knowledge 2010). Taken as 
a whole these theories are descriptive of a world mind. 
Bayesian inference and semiotics 
Bayesian inference may be understood in conjunction with information theory. The basic 
relationship is: 
                   
Where    is the nth possible distinguishable state of event . The complete set of probabilities 
assigned to the    form a probability distribution which sums to 1. We can consider such    as 
equivalent to an exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of hypotheses    composing a model H. 
In this case information is defined: 
                  
When the log of the probability is base 2 information is measured in bits which are the basic unit 
of distinction.  
Information measures the surprise we can expect if    proves to be true. If the hypothesis is 
assigned a small probability then we receive a large amount of information if we become certain 
of its truth and vice versa. 
The above definition of information in terms of probability also provides us with a definition of 
probability in terms of information: 
        
       
       is the measure of plausibility assigned to hypothesis     being true and it is equal to 
        where       is the amount of information received if    is found to be certain. This 
definition makes clear probability’s epistemic nature; it is a function of incomplete information. 
Such sets of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses provide a complete model of the 
outcomes of event . The model contains a listing of all possible distinguishable states. Such 
models have the property of entropy E which is the expected amount of information required to 
bring the model to certainty. Entropy is measured in units of bits. Thus entropy is the number of 
binary distinctions which must be made in order for the model to arrive at certainty.  
Using the equation defining information we see that there is an inverse to entropy or ignorance; 
it is a probability which may be used as a definition of knowledge K: 
K = 2-E 
K is the measure of plausibility assigned to a model’s ability to predict correct outcomes and it is 
equal to 2-E   where E is the entropy of the model. Knowledge and entropy describe our state of 
knowledge in relation to certainty. One is merely a re-scaling of the other; entropy measures the 
number of true-false distinctions which separate the state of a model from certainty, knowledge 
measures the distance the model has come towards certainty. 
A model can only be considered a model if it maintains some accuracy in its representation of 
the phenomena it is modeling. It is a mathematical theorem that such accuracy may only be 
maintained by the model if its probabilities are reassigned on the reception of new information 
in accordance with Bayesian updating. 
                
        
      
 
The concepts we have described: information, probability, models and Bayesian updates are 
components of what might be called inferential systems. Together with phenomena the 
inferential system forms a type of semiotic process: 
1) Information is a sign which signifies aspects of phenomena 
2) A model in the form of a probability distribution is the interpretant of this information 
when the model is updated to reflect the implications of the information. 
Further an inferential system may be understood in terms of a semiotic process based on 
Spencer-Brown’s fundamental concept of distinction. Models assign probabilities to 
distinguishable states. The current state of a models is reflected in its entropy; the number of 
distinctions which separate the model from certainty. 
Semiotics may also serve to remind us that the inferential process is a unity. Information, 
probability, models and Bayesian updates are concepts which require each other. For instance 
light from a distance star may contain information concerning the nature of the intervening 
spaces through which it has travel if it is able to interact with and update a model, such as one 
contained in an astronomers brain. However no distinctions are made due to that light if no 
model is updated with the implications of those distinctions. Light from a star falling on a rocky 
outcrop contains little information. 
Bayesian inference and Darwinian processes 
This author has demonstrated the one to one correspondence between the steps of the 
algorithms for Bayesian processes and Darwinian processes (2009, 2010). However this 
correspondence is obvious with even informal observations. 
If we examine this process within the familiar context of biology we can identify characteristics 
with genes and varieties of these characteristics with the various alleles of the gene. The 
probability distribution of the alleles shifts from generation to generation according to selection 
pressure. The formula used to describe this shift is: 
   
    
         
  
  
 
     (Ricklefs 1979)     
Where p’ is the probability of the particular allele in the latter generation, p is the probability of 
the particular allele in the former generation, RA is the fitness of the particular allele and    is the 
average fitness of all competing alleles. This is clearly a Bayesian update of the probabilities 
making up the alleles’ distribution. 
Another persuasive illustration of the isomorphism between inferential systems and Darwinian 
processes involves a device designed by Francis Galton (1877) and used in a lecture to the Royal 
Society. The device, pictured below, has recently been re-discovered within the statistics 
community and repurposed as a ‘visualization of Bayes’ theorem’ (Stigler 2011). 
 
 
The device contains three compartments: a top one representing the prior distribution, a middle 
one representing the application of the likelihood to the prior and a third representing the 
normalization of the resulting distribution. Beads are loaded in the top compartment to 
represent the prior distribution and then are allowed to fall into the second compartment. The 
trick is in the second compartment where there is a vertical division in the shape of the 
likelihood distribution. Some of the beads fall behind this division and are ‘wasted’; they are 
removed from sight and the remaining beads represent the product of the prior and likelihood 
functions, the ‘Bayesian update’. 
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about this demonstration is that Galton never mentioned 
Bayes in his lecture; he had probably never heard of him or his theorem. Rather, his purpose in 
building the device was to demonstrate the principle of natural selection.  The top compartment 
represents the child generation with variations and the middle compartment represents the 
individuals selected from that generation. 
That this device may be used to model both Bayesian inference and a Darwinian process 
illustrates an isomorphism between the two. The pertinent implication is that any system driven 
by a Darwinian process is performing inference. The predictive accuracy of its internal model is 
increased by processing the data available to it, its experiences in the broader world.  
Conclusion 
The work of Spencer Brown is provocative and its reception varied but muted. Extreme claims 
have been made for its mathematical importance. The book jacket of some editions of Laws of 
Form contains an endorsement from Bertram Russell “Not since Euclid’s Elements have we seen 
anything like it’. Others have dismissed it as a work of mysticism with little mathematical 
content. This view has not been mitigated by Spencer-Brown’s subsequent claim to be the 
reincarnation of the Buddha. His work has largely been ignored by the mathematical 
community. 
The major exception to this is Louis Kauffman, of the University of Illinois, who has made a 
major study of Spencer-Brown’s work and has attempted to extend it. He may be looked to for a 
more balanced assessment. Kauffman concludes that Spencer-Brown has completed a program, 
begun by Peirce (2001):  
Spencer-Brown’s work can be seen as part of a continuous progression that began with 
Peirce’s Existential Graphs. In essence what Spencer-Brown adds to the existential 
graphs is the use of the unmarked state. That is, he allows the use of empty space in 
place of a complex of Signs. This makes a profound difference and reveals a beautiful 
and simple calculus of indications underlying the existential graphs. 
 
Kauffman also makes available a draft of his book concerning Laws of Form (2011). This in-
depth scholarly work contains much of the content of his earlier paper but also demonstrates the 
application of Spencer-Brown’s paradigm to topics in biology, quantum physics and topology.  
 
There is a kind of blinding clarity about these simple ideas near the beginning of Laws 
of Form. They point to a clear conception of world and organism arising from the idea 
of a distinction. Nevertheless, if you follow these ideas out into any given domain you 
will be confronted by, perhaps engulfed by, the detailed complexities of that domain. 
 
In brief Kauffman accepts Spencer-Brown’s work as foundational and endorses his conclusions 
concerning the existence of a world mind; the striving of the universe to know itself. This 
conclusion is base on the understanding that at the bottom of existence is a distinction between 
a state which knows and a separate state which is known. However this understanding is 
mathematical and little guidance is offered as to its physical implementations. 
A path I have outlined is to consider Spencer-Brown’s distinction within the context of 
semiotics, as suggested by Kauffman, and to further consider Bayesian inference as a well 
developed mathematical description of semiotic systems. In this view distinction is seen as 
fundamental to Bayesian inference as it is the unit of information. 
Further inferential systems are implemented within a wide range of physical settings as 
Darwinian processes. Darwinian processes are perhaps the fundamental mechanism within 
nature whereby one state may come to know another and are utilized by a plethora of scientific 
theories across a broad expanse of subject matters; as examples: cosmology (Smolin 1997), 
fundamentals of quantum theory (Zurek 2009), biology (Darwin 1872), neuroscience (Adams 
1998) and culture (Blackmore 1999).  The noting of the existence of this set of unified 
interdisciplinary scientific theories is the motivation for the meta-theory of universal 
Darwinism.  
Universal Darwinism also strives to provide insight into the details of the Darwinian process. 
We might view the fact that each of these many theories describe information processing 
systems designed to increase knowledge as evidence for the existence of a world mind and that a 
fundamental aspect of the universe is its evolving ability to know itself.   
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